Dear Dario,

Thank you for inviting us to propose a special issue on joint action for *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*. In the following we outline our proposal for a special issue entitled “**Joint action: What is shared**?”

**Motivation**

Humans have a remarkable ability to coordinate their actions and work towards common goals. Whereas joint action has received considerable attention in philosophy of action (Bratman 1992, 1999 [1997]; Velleman 1997; Gilbert 1992; Tuomela 1995; Pacherie and Dokic 2006; Roth 2004; Kutz 2000) and research on communication (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Clark, 1996; Galantucci, 2005), the development of this ability (Brownell, Ramani, & Zerwas, 2006; Tomasello, 2009) and the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying it (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006) have only recently started to be addressed. Across different disciplines, the question of what is shared in joint action is of central interest. In the light of recent empirical and conceptual advances on this question, now seems to be the perfect time to set up a proper exchange between the disciplines studying joint action. This became especially apparent at the third Joint Action Meeting (JAM 3, Amsterdam 2009) where new perspectives and synergies resulted from an intense exchange between philosophers, cognitive and developmental psychologists, and communication researchers.

**Call for papers**

Joint Action: What is Shared?

Researchers have appealed to many kinds of sharing in explaining or characterising joint action. Joint actions are variously said to involve shared intentions or goals, shared task representations, shared attention, shared common ground, and more. Each putative case of sharing raises numerous questions. Is talk of sharing in this context literal or metaphorical; and if metaphorical, how is the metaphor to be understood? Is such sharing constitutively necessary for joint action? What cognitive and conceptual demands does such sharing place on the agents? How does such sharing facilitate joint action? How does it develop, and what is its role in development? What awareness of other agents of a joint action, if any, does such sharing require? In what ways is such sharing apparent to us when we perceive or recognise joint actions done by others? Further questions concern interactions and conceptual relations between the different kinds of sharing. Do shared intentions interact with shared task representations? How many kinds of sharing are involved in joint action—are intentions shared in the same sense that task representations are, for instance? The proposed issue aims to address questions such as these with contributions from social, cognitive and developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy.

Themes that contributors to the special issue may address include (but are not limited to):

Plural predication and joint action

Development of joint action and social understanding

Shared intention

Mechanisms for joint action

Joint action and understanding other minds

**Guest editors**

Natalie Sebanz is associate professor of Cognitive Psychology at Radboud University Nijmegen, working at the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Behaviour. Her main research interest concerns the cognitive and neural mechanisms that enable humans to engage in joint action. She has published widely on this topic and is one of the organizers of JAM, a bi-annual interdisciplinary joint action meeting. For publications and further information please see http://www.somby.nl

Stephen Butterfill is associate professor in Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His research is in philosophy of mind and action, with a focus on philosophical issues in developmental psychology. He has worked on several collaborative projects with psychologists on themes related to theory of mind, causal understanding and testimony. For publications and further information please see http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/faculty/butterfill/

**Selection of recent literature**

Apperly, I., & Butterfill, S. (in press). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review.

Bratman, Michael (1992), "Shared Cooperative Activity". The Philosophical Review, 101(2):327-341

--- (1999 [1997]), "I Intend that We J", in *Faces of Intention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Brownell, C. A., Ramani, G. B., & Zerwas, S. (2006). Becoming a Social Partner with Peers: Cooperation & Social Understanding in 1- & 2-year-olds. Child Development*, 2006, 77*, 803-821.

Daum, M. M., Sommerville, J., & Prinz, W. (2009). Becoming a social agent: Developmental foundations of an embodied social psychology. European Journal of Social Psychology*, 39*, 1196-1206.

Galantucci, B., & Sebanz, N. (2009). Joint action: Current perspectives. Topics in Cognitive Science*, 1*, 255-259.

Gilbert, Margaret (1992), *On Social Facts.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Knoblich, G., & Sebanz, N. (2008). Evolving intentions for social interaction: From entrainment to joint action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 363,* 2021-2031.

Kutz, Christopher (2000), "Acting Together". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1):1-31

Pacherie, E., & Dokic, J. (2006). From mirror neurons to joint actions. Journal of Cognitive Systems Research*, 7*, 101-112.

Roth, Abraham Sesshu (2004), "Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments". The Philosophical Review, 113(3):359-410

Tomasello, M. (2009). *Why We Cooperate*. MIT Press.

Tuomela, Raimo (1995), *The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions.* Stanford: Stanford University Press

Velleman, David (1997), "How To Share An Intention". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57(1):29-50

**Invited contributors** (\*agree to accept an invitation if the special issue goes head)

1) Michael Bratman, Stanford University, Department of Philosophy

<http://philosophy.stanford.edu/profile/Michael+Bratman/>

\*2) Celia Brownell, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Psychology

<http://www.pitt.edu/~toddlers/ESDL/brownell.html>

3) Mike Martin, University College London, Department of Philosophy

<http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/%7Euctymfm/>

\*4) Elisabeth Pacherie, Ecole Normale Superieure, Institut Jean-Nicod

<http://pacherie.free.fr/>

5) Wolfgang Prinz, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences

<http://www.cbs.mpg.de/staff/prinz-10359>

**Potential authors and reviewers**

The contributors to the third Joint Action Meeting (JAM 3) will be invited to act as authors or reviewers, as well as other joint action experts.

Behne, Tanya

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Richardson, Michael J.

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Smith, Thomas

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Spranger, Michael

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Tsai, Jessica Chia-Chin

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